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The Future of the U.S.-Japanese Security Alliance1 
Frank Umbach 
1. Introduction: The Incident at Ominato 
“A few years back three American warships steamed into Mutsu Bay, an indentation carved out of the 
northern coast of Honshu, the main Japanese Island. The ships were making for the Japanese naval base of 
Ominato. Once at the base it was evident the officer in charge knew the commander of the American ships 
well. Over dinner the American mentioned that his ships were low on fuel. Could he refuel at Ominato? 
There was some urgency to the situation as a storm was brewing in the pacific. The American boats had 
only a short window of opportunity to beat the storm back to the Seventh Fleet Headquarter at Yokohama. 
The Japanese commander was perfectly amenable. To go by regulations he would just notify Tokyo first. 
It turned out to be far from easy, however. Eventually he got his answer, which was no. Under no circum-
stances was the Japanese commander to provide to provide fuel for the American warships. Faced with 
this refusal the American boats retreated across Tsugaru Straits separating the main island of Honshu 
from Hokkaido and managed to buy the needed fuel from a commercial vendor in the port of Hakodate. 
Too much time had been lost, however. The storm was threatening in the Pacific, and  this forced the 
American boats to return to Yokusuka the long way, around the Sea of Japan side of Honshu and then up 
to Yokusuka from the south.”2 
The Ominato story comes not from the American, but from the Japanese side. It was only one 
of many accounts and interesting pieces of information I heard in 1995 and the spring of 1996 
from Japanese government and public officials (including serving military officers), as well as 
foreign policy specialists during several extraordinary briefings for a security study group con-
sisting of Japanese and American researchers and academics, including two European partici-
pants from NATO countries. These briefings had been organized by a “U.S.-Japan Security 
Treaty Study Group” (established in December 1995) at the Japan Institute for International 
Affairs (JIIA) - a think tank affiliated with the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo. 
During these seminars, all officials spoke off the record, i.e. on condition of being able to pre-
serve their anonymity.  
While this particular story indicated that behind the scenes military co-operation between 
the United States and Japan was much less than ideal, we also heard positive reports. But as 
                                                 
1  This chapter is a revised and an updated version of a paper originally presented at the conference ‘Japa-
nese and German Foreign Policies in Comparative Perspective’, Tuebingen, 21-23 September 1998. The 
analysis is based on findings of my research project ‘Perspectives of Regional Security Cooperation in 
Asia-Pacific’, sponsored by the Volkswagen Foundation. I would also like to use this opportunity to thank 
the Volkswagen Foundation and my former colleagues of our study group at the Japan Institute of Interna-
tional Affairs (JIIA) in Tokyo in 1996. 
2  The following story here is taken from an unpublished paper by Mosher (1997: 1). 
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U.S. Prof. Michael A. Mosher (another member of this security study group) later concluded, 
the dominant tone of (our) discussions and briefings was rather critical. To the Ominato inci-
dent, he noted in 1997:  
“What this story illustrates is not Tokyo’s arbitrariness or vindictiveness towards an ally, but in some 
ways the more astonishing fact that on the most mundane issues there has never been any explicit agree-
ment between the Japanese Self Defense Forces and the American military. Even more astonishingly, 
there was in many instances little room for informal cooperation between commanders.”3 
In the past, the bilateral U.S.-Japanese security alliance played a key role, not only for the 
economic prosperity and external stability of Japan, but it also greatly contributed to interna-
tional peace and stability in the region and on a global level. However, the
 raison d’etre for 
the U.S.-Japan security alliance began to dissipate with the collapse of the former Soviet Un-
ion (FSU) and the rusting away of the once mighty Soviet Pacific Fleet. Notwithstanding se-
curity concerns about North Korea and others, Japanese scholars and some U.S. experts were 
beginning to doubt any need for a U.S. military presence in Japan and particularly in Okinawa. 
In the United States, the first Clinton administration appeared more interested in domestic 
problems and was looking for a reduction in its global military burden. Against this back-
ground, the forced withdrawal of the U.S. troops from the Philippine military bases in 1992 
signaled for many East Asian states the beginning of a military-political disengagement and a 
progressive withdrawal of the United States from the region under pressure.  
These developments also seemed to confirm arguments in the literature on alliance theory 
that, once a unifying threat withers, alliances logically disintegrate or lose their raison d’etre.4 
But as we see in the case of NATO, alliances might survive even when the former common 
danger has disappeared. We can also conclude that alliances functioning during a bi-polar era 
remain fundamentally different in both theory and practice from those evolving in a multi-
polar world.5 Given the complex strategic and military dimensions of the Asia-Pacific region 
and the changing web of relations, “realist” and “neoliberal-institutionalist” theories of inter-
national relations have all their strengths and limits in explaining state behavior and interna-
tional relations. In this light, a combination of these theories, together with network-models 
and constructivism (including the use of “strategic culture”6 as an analytical tool) provides the 
most suitable framework for organizing thoughts and arguments.7 
In the regional security perception of ASEAN member states and other Asian powers, in-
cluding Japan, the PRC’s policy in the South China Sea8 seemed increasingly willing to fill 
out the “political vacuum” the U.S. left through the withdrawal of its armed forces from the 
                                                 
3  Ibid. 
4  See also Feske (1997), Walt (1987: 32). See also Walt (1989), Snyder (1990 and 1991). 
5  See also Spero/Umbach (1994: 15ff.). 
6  Ball (1993), Johnston (1995) and Katzenstein (1996). 
7  Lebow/Risse-Kappen (1993), Rittberger (1993.), Wendt (1995). 
8  To Beijing‘s South China Sea policy and the implications for ASEAN, the ARF and CSCAP dialogue 
processes see Umbach (1998a and 2000b). 
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Philippines in 1992. At the same time, and in the light of growing semi-isolationist tendencies 
in the U.S. policy, an increasing number of American politicians (especially in the U.S. Con-
gress) tried to counterbalance these tendencies, but demanded that Japan share more of the 
security burden in the western Pacific - partly to keep the U.S. involved and partly to balance 
China. Furthermore, the bilateral trade disputes, too, complicated the need for a redefinition of 
the bilateral security alliance between the United States and Japan prior to 1995. 
On the other hand, since the beginning of the 1990s, Japan’s foreign, security and defense 
policies have already undergone significant changes - albeit rather gradually and incremen-
tally.9 In November 1995, the National Defense Outline was revised for the first time in 20 
years to meet the demands of the post-Cold War era. In April 1996, the Japan-U.S. security 
pact was “redefined” and the two countries issued a joint declaration outlining a renewed se-
curity alliance for the 21st century. On September 1997, revised “guidelines” for the security 
treaty were published which envisage Japanese support for the U.S. in minesweeping, evacu-
ating and rescue operations and, subject to UN approval, the inspection of shipping in situa-
tions that may have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security.  
These changes in Japanese security and defense policies were and remain a subject of con-
tinuing public discussion in Japan itself as well as in other Asian countries, in particular 
China. At the same time, however, Japan has become a strong supporter of the new multilat-
eral security institutions of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Council Security Co-
operation in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP).10 Furthermore, Japan is a key member of the Korean En-
ergy Development Organization (KEDO) which is presently facing its greatest crisis (given 
the unresolved financial questions) since its creation in 1994.11 These new multilateral secu-
rity institutions seem to follow European experiences based on co-operative security models 
and regional integration. In the long-term, they may offer better security perspectives to Japan 
and other East Asian countries and thus replace the bilateral security ties with the U.S., as 
their proponents presume. 
Against this background, questions arise concerning the purpose and objectives of the new 
bilateral security treaty and particularly of the “guidelines” for the U.S.-Japanese defense co-
operation, the perception of the alliance in neighboring countries (particularly in China, 
South- and North Korea, Taiwan and the ASEAN states) and the expectations linked with the 
redefined security alliance, especially in the U.S. and Japan. Moreover, not all problems have 
been solved and parts of the new security and defense co-operation are still heavily disputed in 
Japan. In this light, and given the current financial and economic crisis, as well as the lack of 
political leadership in Japan, some doubts still remain whether Japan is really able to adhere to 
the agreed defense co-operation particularly in crises and emergency situations. In this paper, I 
                                                 
9  To these changes in Japan’s foreign and security policies see once again Umbach (2000b). 
10  See also Kawasaki (1997). 
11  See  Umbach (1999a and 1999b). 
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will analyze the evolution of the redefinition of the bilateral U.S.-Japan security alliance and 
focus specifically on the remaining problems and disputes. 
2. The U.S.-Japanese Security Alliance in the Cold War 
The Japan-U.S. security relationship did not start with the end of World War II, but began 
with the arrival of the U.S. fleet commanded by Matthew C. Perry, which led to the signing of 
a peace and amity treaty between the two countries and to the Meiji Restoration (1868). But, 
from the very beginning, this bilateral relationship could be characterized by the grim fact that 
the two nations have never been friendly on equal terms. The unequal nature was particularly 
evident in the first period after World War II, which lasted until the beginnings of the 1970s. 
The U.S. occupation carried out fundamental democratic reforms in almost all aspects of Japa-
nese society, but also compromised on many others. During this time, the most important was 
the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy in its 1947 Constitution (Article 9). 
A second period of the U.S.-Japan security alliance began 1951 and lasted until 1960. In 1951 
both sides signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the highly unequal Mutual Security 
Treaty. Although the Peace Treaty formally ended the occupation, Japan remained a military 
satellite of the U.S. In 1960, Japan’s profile was increased with the signing of the highly con-
troversial bilateral defense pact, which opened a third phase. Although Japan was included 
strategically in the global security and defense policies of the U.S., Tokyo also benefited from 
the alliance. It eliminated provisions allowing Washington to intervene in Japanese politics (to 
“put down large-scale riots”), provided a nuclear umbrella and obliged the U.S. to defend 
Japan if attacked, as well as to consult Tokyo for using military bases in Japan for U.S. 
military missions elsewhere (like in Vietnam).  
As early as the 1970s, the U.S. government of Nixon and Kissinger sought to reduce U.S. 
overseas commitments in order to facilitate the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam. The 
Nixon-Doctrine provided Japan with the opportunity to play a more “autonomous” diplomatic 
role within the basic U.S.-Japan security alliance. This culminated in the National Defense 
Program Outline in October 1976 and the November 1978 Guidelines for the U.S.-Japan De-
fense Co-operation. The first of these called for 60 anti-submarine warfare (ASW) ships, 16 
submarines, 2 mine-sweeping flotillas and 16 ASW squadrons, supplemented by 220 aircraft. 
At that time,
 Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) started to undergo a major mod-
ernization, both in quantity and quality. In 1981, Japan and the U.S. discussed quietly and then 
stated publicly that Japan would expand its commitment to sea lane defense within 1,000 
miles. The new “burden-sharing” allowed U.S. naval forces to concentrate on other roles and 
in other areas of the Pacific. However, over the next few years, a gap between the political 
commitment to adopt such a policy and the reality of Japan’s efforts to attain the necessary 
capability continued to grow. But it was never a hollow Japanese promise, as U.S. naval ex-
perts confirmed in 1996: “Judging by JMSDF improvements after 1990, Japan may well have 
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exceeded expectations. Any further doubt as to the capacity of the JMSDF to perform this 
mission may be dispelled by a reexamination of naval forces in the Western Pacific.”12 
While Japan was also willing to pay an increasing share of the U.S. defense costs, it was 
technologically the most capable non-nuclear force in the region at the end of the Cold War. 
With Japan’s increasing economic power, the bilateral security relationship entered a period 
of competition and rivalry until 1986. Since then, at least economically, the bilateral relation-
ship appears to have been entering a new period on the basis of a more “equal partnership”. 
However, this cannot be said of the bilateral security relationship. The nature of the “patron-
client relationship” within the “unequal alliance” was to remain basically “unequal”. While 
the U.S. has the treaty obligation to defend Japan, the latter has no defense obligation in cir-
cumstances where U.S. territory or U.S. troops in East Asia are attacked. However, similar to 
Japan’s growing role in foreign policies, it has, since the beginning of the 1990s, gradually 
adopted a more visible defense posture within the bilateral alliance. 
Given China’s present objections and criticism of the U.S.-Japanese security alliance, it 
should be noted that China’s view of the security alliance was not always so negative during 
the Cold War era. Beijing’s security perception was not so much determined by the nature of 
the alliance per se than by its perception of the sources of threat to its security. During the 
1970s and early 1980s, for instance, when both relationships with the U.S. and Japan had im-
proved, it regarded the security alliance as a military counterweight to the perceived increas-
ing Soviet military threat to China and in the Asia-Pacific region. Accordingly, it has seen the 
U.S. security alliances with Japan and South Korea not as inherently hostile to its security 
interests but rather as a stabilizing force in the new geopolitical structure in the region. Thus, 
the Chinese view has changed significantly over time from extreme hostility to high tolerance 
due to Beijing’s geostrategic interests and assessment of the world balance of power, the qual-
ity of its own relationship to both powers, and the priorities of its national security interests, 
such as the implications for China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.13 
3. The New Security Environment in East Asia after the End of the Cold  
War 
In the Cold War, the security landscape of the Asia-Pacific region was determined in large by 
the major powers - the United States, Russia, China and Japan. With the end of the Cold War 
and the demise of the Soviet Union, as well as the reduction of the U.S. military presence in 
the region, the roles of China, Japan, the United States, Taiwan, both Korean states and 
ASEAN countries are changing in accordance with the new fluid environment and “new un-
                                                 
12  Woolley/Woolley (1996: 52). 
13  See Wang/Wu (1998). 
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certainties”. Apart from socio-economic security challenges, these “new uncertainties” can be 
summarized in the following way: 
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• unresolved historical border and territorial conflicts (like in the South China Sea);  
•  proliferation of ballistic missiles and nuclear, chemical and biological warheads as well 
as advanced conventional weapons14; 
• socio-economic and transnational security challenges (regionalisation and decentralisa-
tion in domestic policies, migration, environment, etc.); 
•  nationalist tendencies in domestic and foreign policies; 
•  China’s growing economic, military and geopolitical weight.15  
A perfect example how these “new uncertainties” are sometimes interlinked with each other 
can be seen in the dispute of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands between China and Japan (see the 
following box). These events have underscored for neighboring countries such as ASEAN 
member states the uncertainties arising from the unpredictable transformation processes under 
way in China and lingering historical sentiments of Japan’s political elite and society that can 
fuel unresolved conflicts and escalate these to a level where governments can lose the political 
control of events. 
The Territorial conflict of Senkaku/Diaoyu-Islands 
These islands are located about 200 km north of Taiwan and 300 km west of Japan’s islands of Oki-
nawa. They are disputed between Japan, China and Taiwan. Like other territorial disputes over is-
lands, the Senkaku Islands are for legal, historical and geographical reasons problematic. Moreover, 
the sea around the Senkaku Islands might contain “one of the largest oil and gas reservoirs in the 
world” as a UN-report stated in 1968.16 In 1972, Japan was given control of the Senkaku Islands by 
the United States, which had administered them along with Okinawa since the end of World War II. 
But Washington made clear at that time that administrative power does not mean sovereignty. None-
theless, in 1977, Tokyo declared a 12-nm zone as fishing waters surrounding the islands. Since then, 
Taiwanese fishing boats have been obliged to stay outside the zone, which is secured by Japanese 
patrol boats.  
In July 1996, Taiwan protested in an alliance with the PRC (!) and Macao against Japan’s deci-
sion to include the islands in its 200-nm Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). When Japan ratified the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in June 1996 and the Japanese government ap-
proved its EEZ on 7 June 1996, announcing the decision to include the islands on 20 July 1996, Japa-
nese rightwing and ultra-nationalist groups of the Japan Youth Federation erected a flag and light-
house on one of the islets. The official reaction of the Japanese government was legalistic rather than 
political in nature, arguing that the lighthouse was erected privately by a Japanese citizen and there-
fore could not be removed. They could also find no legal reasons for ordering its removal.17 Finally, 
Japan declared symbolically that it neither supports nor opposes the activities of private Japanese 
citizens.18 Japanese rightists used the opportunity to push a view of Japan’s legacy and future onto a 
                                                 
14  See Umbach (1998b, 1998e, 1999d and 2000a). To the impact of the financial and economic crisis on the 
arms build-up in the region - see Umbach (1998c and 1998d). 
15  The World Bank has also rushed to conclusions that China’s economy will surpass the United States by 
2020 in terms of total economic output and total purchasing power - see The Korea Herald (henceforth 
TKH), (23 April 1997: 7), Die Welt (12 April 1997: 14 and 1 September 1997: 25). 
16  See ‘Rocks of Contention’ (1996: 15). 
17  See Soeya (1996).  
18  The Japanese government declared to have no legal means of stopping the expeditions by Japanese ex-
tremists because the islands belong to Japanese individuals and so are private property. But characteristi-
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weak coalition government that was divided over these issues and faced the further complication of 
forthcoming parliamentary elections in October 1996.  
Taiwanese nationalists, in turn, appealed to Beijing that it should no longer use bellicose rhetoric 
or military force to intimidate Taiwan but should instead focus on “its true rival”, Japan.19 In Hong 
Kong and Taiwan, nationalists burned Japanese flags and demanded tough measures against Japan 
and the deployment of troops to the Diaoyu Islands in order to protect Chinese fishermen.20 Conse-
quently, after a year of mounting tensions between Taiwan and China, a (tactically) unusual, but also 
nationalist alliance of both Chinese states together with Hong Kong and Macao emerged out of the 
blue against Japan.21 Students, veterans, fishermen and numerous political groups in China, Taiwan, 
Hong Kong and Macao had unified in an anti-Japanese sentiment by condemning the “revival of 
Japanese militarism and aggression”. They started spontaneous protests day and night, targeting 
Japanese embassies, consulates and companies. Moreover, an orchestrated civilian landing of 300 
activists from Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao, aboard a 50-boat flotilla, displaying flags to assert 
Chinese sovereignty over the tiny East China Sea archipelago on some of the eight barren islets after 
outmaneuvering a naval cordon of 30 Japanese patrol boats, in October 1996 raised the very real dan-
ger of a violent clash with Japanese nationalists and regular Japanese patrol boats. Finally, the crisis 
culminated in the death of a Hong Kong activist who jumped off a protest ship, intending to assert 
China’s rights over the islands.22 Since that incident, both sides have been trying to settle the dispute 
diplomatically.23  
The dispute has raised specific questions about a resurgent Chinese irredentist nationalism24 
which threatens China’s ties with Asia’s biggest economic power, Japan, as well as with ASEAN 
member states. Whilst both sides have repeatedly reiterated their principal positions on the island 
question, they have become slowly aware of the escalation potential over territorial disputes that 
threaten their governments” ability to control newly arising provocations by extreme nationalists as 
non-state actors on both sides.25 Taiwan and Japan are also seeking to defuse the escalating row over 
the island’s sovereignty and to focus on fishing rights and resources as well as untapped petroleum 
reserves around these islands.26 But a real political solution for the disputed islands seems to be very 
far from the horizon.27 In retrospect, “the controversy might reflect a new dynamism within and 
across three Chinese territories, as well as in Sino-Japanese relations”, as Yoshihide Soeya, a well-
known political scientist at Tokyo’s Keio-University, speculated at that time. 
                                                                                                                                                        
cally for the inaction of the Japanese government, using it as election ammunition, it has not even ap-
proached the owners to find out their approval of the landing. See Ching (1996) and Kevin Sullivan/Mary 
Jordan, TKH (2 August 1996: 4) and idem, Financial Times (henceforth FT), (11 September 1996: 5). 
19  See Virginia Sheng, The Free China Journal (26 July 1996: 1). 
20  See International Herald Tribune (henceforth IHT), (13 September 1996: 4). 
21  See also IHT (12 September 1996: 1 and 10) and ibid. (11 September 1996: 4), Nina Gerstenberg, Die 
Welt (11 September 1996: 7) and idem, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (henceforth FAZ), (21 September 
1996: 3). 
22  See IHT (24 September 1996: 1 and 8) and ibid. (27 September 1996: 4). 
23  See ibid. (7-8 September 1996: 4 and 10); ibid. (10 September 1996: 4) and FT (24 September 1996: 14). 
24  See also Forney (1996). 
25  See also Ching, (1997). 
26  To some extent, these bilateral Taipei-Tokyo talks are even more complicated than the China-Japan nego-
tiations over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands because the sovereignty issue is always complicated by cross-
Straits-relations. Taiwan’s four-point position is: insistence on sovereignty over the Diaoyutais, a rational 
attitude, no-Taipei-Beijing cooperation, and protection of Taiwan fishing rights - see Virginia Sheng, The 
Free China Journal (12 October 1996: 2). 
27  See also Virginia Sheng, The Free China Journal (5 October 1996: 1). 
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Furthermore, Japan is now confronted with an increasing ballistic missile threat from 
China and North Korea, as the North Korean missile test of August 1998 demonstrated (see 
the following overview).28 
 
Theater Ballistic Missiles Capable of Reaching Japan 
Country Name Range (km) Notes 
Russia Scud-B/C 300-500 Deployment details unknown 
Dongfeng-21/CSS-5 1.800 Deployment details unknown 
Dongfeng-3/CSS-2 2.800 Being retired? 
Dongfeng-4/CSS-3 4.750 Deployment details unknown 
Dongfeng-21X 3.000 In development 
Dongfeng-25 1.800 In development 
China 
Julang-1/CSS-N-3 1.700 SLBM (Xia SSBN) 
Scud C 500-650 Deployment details unknown 
No-Dong 1 1.000 At least 20+ deployed 
No-Dong 2 1.500+ in development 
Taepo-Dong  1 2.000 In development; tested in August 
1998 
North Korea 
Taepo-Dong 2 4.000+ In development 
Source:  Umbach  (1999c: 36). 
Moreover, the significance of the South China Sea and open
 Sea Lanes of Communication 
(SLOCs) is crucial for the economic survival of Japan, as well as other North- and Southeast 
Asian nations.29 More than one-third of the world’s merchant ships sail through the Southeast 
Asia SLOCs and over 80 percent of Japan’s oil imports reportedly pass through this region. 
No other major power in the world is probably so dependent as Japan on the import of raw 
materials and the export of finished goods to pay for them. With the encouragement of the 
United States and other Western powers, Japan has also widened the tasks and missions of its 
Self Defense Forces by contributing troops to the peacekeeping operations of the UN in lim-
ited roles (especially in Cambodia in 1991). The renewed security treaty with the United 
States in April 1996 and the negotiations to review the “Guidelines for Defense Co-operation” 
in 1978 are - despite all inherent problems and unresolved issues as we will see later - another 
indicator of Japan’s gradually growing political role in East Asia. This is explained, inter alia, 
by the relative decline of American power and a relative rise of other powers in the region due 
                                                 
28  See also Umbach (1999b and 1999c). 
29  See also Nishihara (1994a). To the internal debate in Japan see Hashimoto (1997); Noda (1997); Mochi-
zuki (1995) and Baginda (1994). 
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to the evolution of a more pluralist structure of the international system after the end of the 
Cold War. 
The other countries of the Asia-Pacific region, such as the ASEAN states, are in particular 
concerned about the triangular relationship between the major powers - the United States, 
China and Japan.30 Any conflictual relationship between these powers might destabilize the 
region at large. While, in the last three years, ASEAN has seemed particularly alarmed about 
the U.S.-China relations, they now worry much more about the China-Japan relationship in 
the mid- and long-term. China and Japan have never been great powers simultaneously, whilst 
the emergence of a new great power has historically mostly been fraught with tensions in the 
region, as neighbors and other states see their share of international power diminished. Fur-
thermore, both powers have no clearly articulated roles, whilst their bilateral relationship is 
hampered by considerable suspicion. If their mistrust increases, it might polarize and destabi-
lize the Asia-Pacific region. 
However, the public silence in most East Asian states in regard to the PRC during the Tai-
wan crisis in 1995-96 contrasted significantly with private relief at the demonstration of an 
American counterbalance to China, but with still remaining doubts about its durability. Other 
lingering disputes in the areas of human rights and China’s non-proliferation policies (such as 
the export of ring magnets for nuclear weapons or M-11 missiles to Pakistan) have plagued 
the U.S.-China relations, which have found their expression in the debates over renewing 
China’s most-favored-nation trade status. Meanwhile, China’s growing trade surplus, which 
has further increased by 20 per cent to almost $60 in 1998, has now surpassed that of Japan 
with the U.S. 
Many of those new uncertainties in the post-Cold War era are primarily the result of glob-
alization and rapidly changing internal and external factors which are difficult to forecast and 
draw adequate conclusions for domestic, foreign and defense policies. The Taiwan crisis of 
1995-1996 and the current financial- and economic crisis in East Asia have underscored the 
new dimensions in an era of uncertainty and unpredictability. The immediate specter of the 
U.S.-China confrontation during the Taiwan crisis and the longer-term question of coping 
with China - as a military power, an economic competitor, an energy importer (with many 
foreign and security implications31) and a polluter - have posed broad and multiple challenges 
to the region and to global stability. Thus, China’s missile firings during the Taiwan crisis in 
1995-96 came dangerously close to major shipping lanes that violated another enduring vital 
American and Japanese security interest: freedom of navigation. Against the background of 
the Taiwan crisis and China’s policy of using the instrument of armed forces for pursuing po-
litical objectives, the evolution of these new multilateral co-operation processes in the ARF, 
CSCAP and the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) and stability of the Asia-Pacific 
region still depends on the future national roles, missions and challenges within the triangular 
                                                 
30   See also Drifte (1999). 
31  Calder ( 1997) and Umbach (2000b). 
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relationship among the United States, China and Japan.32 Thus, the question of whether or not 
the three major powers can produce a stable and lasting co-operative relationship has still fun-
damental implications for the entire Asia-Pacific region. Characteristic for these uncertainties 
in the triangular relationship in general and the mutual mistrust between China and Japan in 
particular, one of the best security and defense experts in Japan, Masashi Nishihara, in 1994 
argued: 
“ ... Beijing seems to be pursuing contradictory policies. It wants to participate in multilateral economic 
and security arrangements in the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, it is increasing its military power 
and trying to establish a militarily dominant position in Asia by taking advantage of the current situation 
when the United States and Russia have cut back their armed forces and defense budgets. One path is in-
ternationalist, the other nationalist. ... 
The region does not need a strong China. The evolution of the Chinese navy from a defensive coastal 
force into an offensive blue-water fleet would be destabilizing because it would change the balance of 




4. Japan on the Way to Assuming a Greater Security Role in the Region? 
The Taiwan crisis and the Chinese missile tests, as well as the Senkaku-Diaoyu islands dispute 
in 1995/1996 have heightened fears of a Chinese hegemony in Japan’s political elite and pub-
lic opinion. This has increased the potential for intense strategic competition - if not tension 
and hostility - between these two great powers whose history is characterized by underlying 
tensions, hostility and mutual distrust.34 In this light, ASEAN’s and Japan’s interests in the 
South China Sea appear to converge since both have been alarmed by China’s destabilizing 
activities in the area. Tokyo also agrees with the ASEAN states and the United States that 
China has to be engaged as an equal partner rather than to be contained. On the way to assum-
ing a greater security role in Asia, however, Japan is facing many obstacles - domestically as 
well as externally, including its own economic crisis. 35 
Japan’s lack of political leadership in the current economic recession also provides a strik-
ing picture to the LDP’s new foreign policy concept, entitled “Japan’s Asia-Pacific Strategy - 
A Challenge for Change”, which demands a proactive rather than reactive foreign policy strat-
egy to bring about “positive changes”. In the view of the Japanese governments of recent 
years, a dual strategy focusing on both bi- and multilateralism presents no inherent dialectical 
contradiction. Japan’s security and the peace, as well as stability in the Asia-Pacific region are 
                                                 
32  See Soh, The Straits Times (5 June 1997: 5), Dosch (1998) and Umbach (1998a). 
33  Masashi Nishihara, IHT (12 July 1994). 
34  See Yunling (1997), Harris (1997) and Green/Self (1996). 
35  To these constraints see here once again Umbach (2000b). 
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portrayed rather as a “two-wheeled cart”. According to the administrative vice-minister of 
Japan’s Defense Agency, Akiyama Masahiro in August 1998: 
“One is the existence of bilateral alliances with the U.S., as exemplified by the U.S.-Japan security ar-
rangements. The other is the promotion of confidence building through defense exchanges and security 
dialogues. Only when these two wheels are turning together can we make real progress toward increased 
peace and stability in the region.”36 
Characteristically for Japan’s post-Cold War evolving foreign policies, this first conceptual-
ized long-term foreign policy vision also envisaged a dual strategy of combined bi- and multi-
lateralism. In the context of the bilateral security alliance with the U.S. and the new uncertain-
ties of the region, the following goals can be identified as the most important factors of this 
foreign policy concept: 
 
•  the strengthened U.S.-Japanese alliance will promote peaceful change by deterring arms 
races and aggressive use of force and will be the final guarantor of Japan’s security; 
•  promotion of multilateral security at the ASEAN Regional Forum and in Northeast Asia. 
Hence multilateral security co-operation is expected to complement (and not to replace) 
the U.S.-Japanese security alliance and so contribute to peaceful change; 
•  consolidation of supply and energy that is also indispensable for a “positive sum 
change” and 
•  dynamic alignment with other regions with a view to keeping the region open to the 
world.37 
 
However, the implementation of these and other foreign policy goals is dependent on the po-
litical will and leadership of the Japanese governments, as well as on the domestic political 
consensus. As we will see later, there remain doubts about the ability of Japanese govern-
ments to implement these foreign policy objectives, as well as the agreed defense co-operation 
principles.38 Nonetheless, the crisis on the Korean peninsula in 1994, when the U.S. was seri-
ously considering preventive military strikes to destroy potential North Korean nuclear 
weapon systems and production factories on and below the soil, it became clear for both, Ja-
pan and the U.S., that Tokyo was politically unwilling and constitutionally unable to negotiate 
a solution or to give any military support during the crisis. For both sides, the crisis had a ma-
jor impact on regional security and stability, and thus also to the future of the bilateral security 
alliance. 
 
                                                 
36  See the article of the administrative vice minister of the Defense Agency Akiyama Masahiro (1998a). 
37  See Soeya (1997). This article refers only to the draft of the LDP’s foreign policy guidelines. 
38  See also Cronin (1996). He recommends that the U.S. government avoid asking Japan to do too much. 
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5. Shaping a New Security Alliance - Domestic Debates and Its Impact 
In the view of many security experts inside and outside the region, the alliance has been 
threatened by several factors, including the following: 
•  a spill-over from economic conflict (i.e. the auto-trade and the U.S. trade deficit) that 
might erode the trust in the bilateral relationship39;  
•  a greater military role of Japan that has raised some concerns not only in China40; 
•  the asymmetric nature of the bilateral alliance; 
• newly emerging security threats in the post-Cold War era which had not been previously 
addressed in the bilateral security alliance.  
Against this background, experts as well as the public in both Japan and the United States 
began in 1995 to initiate a more intensive debate about the future of the U.S.-Japanese secu-
rity alliance. 
5.1 USA: Withdrawal or Engagement in the Asia-Pacific Region? - The Nye-
Johnson Controversy 
After the end of the Cold War, the United States painfully recognized its enormous social and 
economic problems. In the absence of an evident threat, the first Clinton administration began 
to give priority to restoring economic competitiveness at home and promoting traditional val-
ues of democracy and human rights overseas in the wider concept of economic interdepend-
ence. But in general, it lacked an all-embracing foreign policy vision for the new post-Cold 
War era. Without a clear strategic rationale and vision, however, U.S. policy has, in recent 
years, been largely at the mercy of competing single-issue groups in domestic U.S. politics, 
covering a wide spectrum including human rights, proliferation and trade. In the view of the 
Chinese political elite, however, U.S. policy is viewed not as an incoherent process (which it 
often really is), but rather as a strategy for keeping China weak and divided, rejecting its status 
as a great power and the legitimacy of the political and ideological regime in Beijing. Whether 
it is criticism of nuclear testing or military modernization, threats of sanctions over intellec-
tual property rights or a tough U.S. stance on China’s entry into the World trade organization, 
they are all perceived and interpreted as part of the U.S “containment strategy” to keep China 
weak. 
Nonetheless, the U.S. domestic discussions and the new post-Cold War environment have 
called for a transformation of Pax Americana in Europe and Asia. They have forced the U.S. 
and Japanese government to redefine the structuring of the bilateral security alliance, as well 
as Japan’s regional and international role which seems to undermine the alliance. At the same 
                                                 
39  To the background see Kreft (1995). 
40  See, for example, IHT (19 April 1996: 4), Michael Richardson, IHT (14 May 1996: 4) and TKH (18 April 
1996: 4). 
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time, Japan’s growing international role and the need to reduce the U.S. military presence in 
the Asia-Pacific have also become, ironically, new imperatives for the continuation of the 
U.S.-Japan security alliance and a
 Pax Americana in the wider Asia-Pacific region. The U.S. 
role as “balancer” and “broker” in Asia is – as in Europe - still necessary in the post-Cold 
War era. Given the still existing mistrust towards Japan in other Asian states and increasing 
nuclear proliferation threats in the region and elsewhere, the U.S. is continues as a “cap in the 
bottle” against the military resurgence of Japan, armed with nuclear weapons.41  
In this light, Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye in 1995 launched a new effort to 
refocus Clinton’s Japan policy away from singular contentious trade issues towards renewing 
the security relationship. In the view of Nye, “Security is like oxygen - you tend not to notice it 
until you begin to lose it, but once that occurs there is nothing else that you will think 
about.”42 Accordingly, the U.S. is still needed for maintaining political order and a security 
framework that will sustain economic growth. The
 U.S. Security Strategy for the East Asia 
Pacific Region, released in February 1995, spelled out in detail the new U.S. strategy of en-
gagement in the region and underlined the need for a forward-based troop presence of 100,000 
U.S.-troops in East Asia. The central objectives of the new U.S. strategy are to foster political 
stability, maintain access to regional markets, ensure freedom of navigation, and prevent the 
rise of any hostile inclinations or the development of a policy of aggression towards other na-
tions. It also reflects the economic importance of Asia for the U.S. The region now accounts 
for more than 40 per cent of U.S. trade - over half a trillion dollars annually. For each of the 
past five years, U.S. exports to Asia have increased an average of 13 per cent. In order to initi-
ate crisis response, deterrence, reassurance, and influence, a proper mix of forward-deployed 
forces, pre-positioned equipment, and military interaction is, in the view of U.S. defense ex-
perts, still needed. 43 
For the U.S. revisionist Chalmers Johnson, however, only “an end to Japan’s protectorate 
status will create the necessary domestic political conditions for Japan to assume a balanced 
security role in regional and global affairs.”44 In his view, it is not China but the U.S. which 
represents East Asia’s greatest security threat in that it “continues to distrust Japan”s ability 
to act as a true ally.”45 Two years later, he still criticized the “artificial prolonging of the 
Cold War in East Asia” which “keeps the Japanese people from seriously debating such top-
ics as their American-imposed constitution, their responsibilities toward peacekeeping opera-
tions around the world, and making clear to the whole world who is actually in charge of the 
country’s more-or-less camouflaged military establishment.”46 In this light, he has repeatedly 
                                                 
41  To trust and mistrust in Japan’s non-nuclear weapon status and increasing regional as well as global pro-
liferation threats of nuclear weapons see Umbach (2000a). 
42  Nye (1995: 91). 
43  See also Flamm (1998). 
44  Johnson (1995: 107). 
45  Ibid. (110). 
46  Johnson (1996: 29). 
 125 
favored the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Japan in general and Okinawa in particular. To-
gether with isolationists and sinocentric Asian strategists, revisionists like Chalmers Johnson 
have thus increasingly criticized the U.S.-Japanese security alliance, Japan’s “free riding” on 
the alliance and any U.S. military entanglement in Asia. But hitherto, those critics of the U.S.-
Japanese security alliance still represent a minority in the U.S. strategic community. 
5.2 Japan: Defining Collective Security and a Mutual Security Alliance 
The benefits of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the Cold War did not come without costs. The U.S. 
geopolitical strategy in the Asia-Pacific after the World War Two had encouraged the rein-
statement of pre-war politicians (including war criminals). This created divisions between 
progressive and conservative forces in Japan’s domestic politics. One of the results of this 
historical legacy after World War II was and continues to be the country’s (in)ability to deal 
with sensitive issues concerning its military and pre-war history. Thus Nicholas D. Kristof has 
argued:  
“The danger remains ... that Japan will recover its nerve before it fully confronts the past. Already Japan 
grows more assertive in foreign relations and slowly rearms. Many young Japanese express disgust for the 
weakness of their government and want Japan to become a normal military power. Should that happen be-
fore East Asia achieves better mutual understanding, the region will become a much more dangerous 
neighborhood.”47 
Furthermore, an increasing number of experts and observers in Japan and the United States 
have become critical of Japan’s “free-riding” or the “defense burden” the U.S. security alli-
ance has placed on Japan.  Pacifist forces thus criticize the U.S.-Japan alliance as another 
form of militarisation and deny the need for a nuclear umbrella.48 Instead of a bilateral secu-
rity alliance with the United States, they are now demanding peaceful foreign and security 
policies in the light of the historical burdens of Japan’s militaristic policies prior to 1945.  
While the international community might recognize that a forceful response to a violation 
of the UN Charter does not conflict with the charter’s own ban on force, the Japanese gov-
ernment has maintained its own views on what constitutes an illegal use of force and has used 
such broad, generalized definitions to justify its non-participation. The same “exceptionalism” 
can be seen in the official positions it takes on collective self-defense. While asserting that 
Japan, like all other countries, has an inherent right to collective defense, the government has 
claimed that the constitutional ban on force precludes it from exercising this right and thus 
participating in collective-security actions, even under the umbrella of the UN. If Japan is to 
contribute to the stability and security of Asia in the future, however, Tokyo needs to clarify 
its attitude on whether it is able to exercise its right of collective self-defense and, as a conse-
quence, to expand its support to the U.S. in times of emergency.  
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The solidity and effectiveness of U.S.-Japan military co-operation until very recently had 
many gaps, as the Gulf War 1990/1991 and the crisis on the Korean peninsula in 1994 re-
vealed. At the time, Japanese officials dithered for weeks over whether to allow transit rights 
for U.S. troops in the event of a Korean confrontation. Most of these problems had to do with 
contingency matters - the heart of any defense planning. Until that time, the main document of 
U.S.-Japan contingency planning had been the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Co-
operation, which should have harmonized the relationship. However, many contingencies 
involving conflicts in the region around Japan had not been addressed at all, though conflicts 
on the Korean peninsula (particularly North Korea’s ballistic missiles) have posed a direct 
threat to Japan. Furthermore, many of the efforts addressed in the 1978 Guidelines simply did 
not work, as the “Ominato“-incident illustrated. The Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) 
were forbidden to re-supply American troops, even with ammunition should they run out. 
And, despite the fact that Japan has one of the largest helicopter fleets in the world, there ex-
isted no arrangement giving armed forces access to these in the event of emergency evacua-
tions, as was the case after the Kobe earthquake in January 1995. Air controllers unions have 
traditionally been distinctly anti-military and have repeatedly resisted letting military planes 
use any runway it supervises. At the time, there was also no guarantee of priority use of major 
civilian airports to SDF or U.S. forces in a military emergency, nor did there exist any plan for 
full scale mobilization or legal authority to use roads or cross private property. Even worse, 
Japan’s political decision-making processes reflect the normative context of a policy biased 
strongly against a forceful articulation of military security. Japan’s Defense Agency is thus 
deeply entrenched in inter-ministerial arrangements which, however, often lack an effective 
co-ordinating mechanism with a Prime Minister who has little control over the Cabinet Secre-
tariat and Ministries.49 In 1995, for instance, only one official was entitled to consult with the 
Prime Minister in the event of an emergency. Consequently, Prime Minister Murayama was 
left to sleep through the morning hours after the disastrous earthquake in Kobe. At the same 
time, the Kobe mayor resisted the request from a divisional commander in Kobe to use the 
support of the SDF forces with their appropriate technical equipment. His permission was a 
legal requirement.50 Furthermore, a U.S. offer to provide an aircraft carrier as a floating hos-
pital was mulled over for days and weeks and then dropped as hundreds died. At the same 
time, other foreign ships with technical and medical equipment were held up outside the port 
because they had no notification by the port authority. Offers of blankets from foreign nations 
were turned down because it might appear that regal Japan was taking handouts from lesser 
nations. As a result, these circumstances were the cause of many unnecessary deaths. 
Meanwhile, Japan was confronted with U.S. demands for a greater burden-sharing and 
supporting the U.S. military presence in Asia. However, most of these pressures or accusa-
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50  See Mosher (1997: 4). 
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tions that Japan is “free-riding” on the U.S., were and continue to be unfounded. There are, at 
present, 45,000 U.S. military personnel  based in Japan. Half of this number comprises a divi-
sion of marines stationed in Okinawa. The U.S. Seventh Fleet which covers the western Pa-
cific and the Indian Ocean has its command headquarters and supply and maintenance facili-
ties based in Japan. These U.S. armed forces play a crucial role, not only for the defense of 
Japan, but also for the whole of Asia and particularly for the defense of South Korea. Japan 
also provides extensive support, termed Host Nation Support (HNS), to facilitate the bilateral 
security arrangement. It also covers labor costs for staff employed by the U.S. military, as well 
as the costs of electricity, gas, water, and other utilities. In 1995, these amounted to $6.2 bil-
lion or 75 per cent of the total expenses for keeping the U.S. military stationed in Japan. 51 
 
6. Forward to the Past? - The Negotiation Process of the Re-Defined U.S.-
Japanese Security Alliance 
6.1 On the Way to the Re-defined Security Treaty of April 1996 
The unlikely coalition government between the pacifist Social Democratic Party of Japan 
(SDPJ) and the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), as well as domestic preoccupa-
tions did not bode very well in 1995 for the re-definition of the security alliance or any for-
eign-policy crisis management. Furthermore, it was a difficult year for Japanese diplomats due 
to the fifthieth anniversaries of the end of the Second World War. Thus the “unholy” govern-
ment coalition was torn between the anti-war resolution of the SDJP, which included a forth-
right apology for Japan’s wartime atrocities, and the LDP’s and particularly its new leader, 
Hashimoto’s, collaboration with Japanese veterans’ associations. Moreover, Hashimoto was, 
in the first part of 1995, still Minister of International Trade and Industry, well-known for his 
uncompromising stand towards U.S. demands in an increasingly difficult economic relation-
ship (especially in the car parts negotiations) between these two countries.  
In the second half of 1995, the focus of the bilateral relationship shifted to the security re-
lationship. The renewing process of the bilateral security alliance between the U.S. and Japan 
suffered a major setback when the rape of a 12-year old girl in Okinawa by three American 
serviceman in September 1995 spurred widespread resentment and controversy in Japan as 
well as, at least partly, in the United States. The rape caused the most serious crisis in the bi-
lateral security alliance with massive protests against the security treaty’s revision in 1960. 
Large-scale demonstrations demanded the removal of all bases from Okinawa. The governor 
of Okinawa, Masahide Ota, was totally opposed to any U.S. security commitment in Japan 
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and Okinawa, refused to sign documents requiring landowners to extend the bases’ leases. At 
the same time, the long-life pacifist leader of the SDPJ, who in the past had led the fight 
against the U.S.-Japanese security alliance and became the head of the coalition government, 
Tomiichi Murayama, was obliged to argue for its maintenance and adopt a crisis management 
for its own party, the shaky coalition government and a damage limitation for the Okinawa 
affair. Moreover, the rape of the 12-year old girl resulted in new debates within Japan as to its 
status as a still existing protectorate of the United States, given the very limited Japanese au-
thority to arrest U.S. servicemen. At the time, an unraveling of the alliance seemed to be a 
distinct possibility. Thus the U.S. Commander of Forces in the Pacific, Richard C. Macke, 
was forced to resign after he heated up tensions by arguing that the men should have paid for 
sex instead of committing rape.52 Although a new minor revision to the Status-of-Forces 
Agreement, which has given Japanese authorities more rights to arrest U.S. servicemen sus-
pected of crimes, was indeed reached, the discussions of a renewed security treaty remained 
very difficult under the existing circumstances of domestic politics, both in Japan and in the 
United States. Both governments had to persuade and convince their public opinion of the 
need for the alliance after the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, the affair raised difficult and 
sensitive questions about the future of the U.S. military presence in Okinawa, where the bulk 
of some 60,000 U.S. troops in Japan are based, and the political-cultural ties between Tokyo 
and Okinawa as a scheduled U.S.-Japanese summit approached in late 1995. In the end, the 
Okinawa crisis helped to open up a debate over Japan’s future defense policies which had for 
many years been almost a taboo subject. Meanwhile, domestic pressures forced Clinton to 
reschedule his trip to Asia for April 1996.  
In the interim, the U.S. and Japanese bureaucracies sought to placate Okinawans with the 
offer of returning an air base, two communications facilities, a port and other military proper-
ties to Okinawa officials and relocating key facilities elsewhere in Japan. The offer of U.S. 
and Japanese bureaucracies, however, failed not only in the negotiation with Okinawa’s 
administration chief, Masahide Ota, but also in the refusal of other regions in Japan to accept 
military installations and bases transferred from Okinawa. While the solution for the military 
bases in Okinawa can only be found in decreasing the burden upon Okinawan residents, a 
total closure of the U.S. bases is, in the foreseeable future, neither feasible nor realistic. With 
the closure of the Clark and Subic Bay bases in the Philippines in 1992, and new security 
challenges for Japan arising from the south, Okinawa’s geostrategic value has increased in the 
Post-Cold War era for both Japan and the United States. 
In order to understand the Okinawans anger it is necessary to mention that it has to host 60 
per cent of the 47,000 U.S. troops stationed in Japan and more than 75 per cent of the U.S. 
military facilities in Japan on an island that occupies less than 1 per cent of the country’s total 
territory. Meanwhile, despite very difficult negotiations between Tokyo and local authorities, 
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the Yamaguchi prefecture agreed to transfer to the U.S. military base in Iwakuni  the KC-130 
Hercules aircraft refueling planes presently stationed at the Futenma Air Station on Okinawa. 
But the relocation of the Futenma’s base heliport operations, which primarily involve U.S. 
Marine Corps training, became a major stumbling block in the Special Action Committee on 
Okinawa (SACO), which was established to deal with relocation questions. Finally, both sides 
agreed to build a sea-based, floating facility off the coast of the main Okinawan island.  
Back in 1996, the Taiwan crisis and China’s missile tests just 60km from the Japanese is-
land of Yonaguni, on which about 1,700 Japanese live, seemed to confirm everyone’s worst 
fears. But the two aircraft carriers sent to the waters off Taiwan helped to reassure the wide-
spread doubts in East Asia that the United States would not allow the balance of power to be 
overturned by force. In the end, it also helped the U.S. and Japan to reaffirm their bilateral 
security treaty, which commits America to the defense of Japan, and agreed to look for ways 
to increase Japan’s contribution to regional security. An opinion poll in a leading Japanese 
newspaper revealed that 70 per cent of Japanese people supported the alliance with the U.S. 
But at the same time, the poll also indicated that 67 per cent favored a reduction in the number 
of U.S. military bases.53 
As early as November 1995, the Japanese government adopted a new National Defense 
Program Outline with corresponding national defense guidelines to broaden the responsibili-
ties to cope with the new challenges and realities in three main fields: (1) defending Japan; (2) 
responding to large-scale disasters and various other situations; and (3) contributing to the 
construction of a more stable security environment.54 It was de facto another step forward to 
“collective defense” which all Japanese governments had hitherto interpreted as constitution-
ally forbidden. Simultaneously, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces underwent a major military re-
form that included the creation of a rapid-reaction force, the redeployment of some divisions 
to more southerly islands of Japan, provision of the defense budget for a new anti-missile de-
fense system under the theatre missile defense program and the acquisition of other advanced 
weapon systems. A gradual revolution of Japan’s security and defense policies was thus under 
way. 
The Clinton-Hashimoto summit in April 1996 deepened and reaffirmed the U.S. security 
relationship in a joint declaration as “essential for preserving peace and stability” in the Asia-
Pacific region. The U.S. also renewed its former commitment to maintain about 100,000 
troops in Asia and not to reduce its presence in Japan. At the same time, the Japanese gov-
ernment went further and pledged a more active Japanese defense role in the region. It agreed 
to expand logistical support for U.S. forces in peacetime. The so-called Acquisition and 
Cross-Servicing Agreement, signed few days before the Clinton-Hashimoto Summit, rein-
forced the Joint Security Agreement through more substantial co-operation between the two 
forces in rear areas, including the supply of fuel to U.S. aircraft by the Self-Defense Forces 
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(SDF), which was formerly not permitted under most circumstances.55 It also signed an 
agreement to intensify contingency planning and to review guidelines for defense co-
operation, not only if Japan were attacked, but also in the event of crisis in areas “surrounding 
Japan”. After 17 months of bilateral work following the Joint Declaration on Security of 
April 1996, the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, composed of Foreign and De-
fense ministers of two governments (commonly called “2+2”), approved and released the 
Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Co-operation. It describes different co-operations between 
the two governments, as well as their armed forces, basically in three categories (see also the 
overview of the guidelines as an annex of the paper): (1) co-operation under normal circum-
stances, (2) actions in response to an armed attack against Japan, and (3) co-operation in 
“situations in areas surrounding Japan that will have an important influence on Japan’s 
peace and security”. Hence, in contrast to the 1978 Guidelines, focusing on bilateral defense 
co-operation at “Japan contingency”, the new Guidelines of September 1997 address more 
regional security challenges of Japan (such as those from the Korean peninsula and potential 
instability in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea).  
Both sides agreed that Japan might in future play a more active role in co-operation with 
U.S. forces in regional crises on the Korean peninsula or over Taiwan. It would also be able to 
take part in intelligence sharing, mine-sweeping operations, to join naval patrols monitoring 
sanctions and to use its navy in search and rescue operations, evacuation of its own nationals 
caught up in a crisis, whilst U.S. forces can make use of facilities in Japan, including civilian 
ports and airports. However, the use of Japanese combat troops is still ruled out whilst other 
questions (such as delivering weapon systems and ammunition to U.S. armed forces in crisis 
or military conflict) remain open to controversial interpretations of the newly defined Guide-
lines. 
6.2 The Guideline Discussion Inside and Outside of Japan 
The new guidelines are motivated to “articulate the modality of Japan-U.S. defense coopera-
tion in response to the new security environment after the Cold War” and “to add more rele-
vance to the Japan-U.S. security arrangements in the post-Cold War environment” by 
strengthening their mutual defense cooperation in specific situations.56 The expansion of the 
security parameter, vaguely described as “areas surrounding Japan” also includes the protec-
tion of Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) and thereby, possibly, the Taiwan Strait and the 
South China Sea, where both the U.S. and Japan have a critical interest in insuring free pas-
sage of the sealanes. Besides the economically critical SLOCs for Japan, some Japanese ex-
perts, such as Toshiya Hoshino, see additional reasons for Japan to defend open SLOCs: “ ... 
the violation of an internationally accepted principle cannot and should not be easily com-
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promised for fear of undermining its relevance in host of other future instances.”57 According 
to his argumentation, the U.S.-Japan alliance is not directed against any country as its target 
nor it is an intention to contain China. The Guidelines of Defense Co-operation are basically 
and “primarily reactive measures to an action that would alter the status quo to the negative 
direction.”58 However, it is also clear that the actions anticipated in the Guidelines cannot be 
ruled out for conflicts in the Taiwan Straits or the South China Sea “if the adversarial situa-
tions were actually triggered against the pledge of resolving the matter peacefully and thus in 
a manner significantly affecting Japan’s peace and security.”59 
Not surprisingly, these guidelines have been criticized in Beijing and other East Asian 
capitals. In Beijing, they have been perceived as further evidence of the U.S. containment and 
a remilitarization of Japan’s
 Self-Defense Forces. That criticism reflects growing tensions 
between China and the United States, as well as between Beijing and Tokyo. Furthermore, 
Japan announced a freeze of its grand aid in response to China’s continued nuclear testing in 
1995 and 1996 (although the diplomatic “assertiveness” of Tokyo was in reality quite limited, 
and indeed one of a double standard, in contrast to Japan’s protests against the nuclear testing 
of France which provoked widespread anger among the public and street demonstrations even 
with the participation of Japanese government officials and Diet representatives). The confir-
mation that a military conflict between China and Taiwan would inevitably mean a crisis oc-
curring in the areas surrounding Japan (that are subject to the new defense co-operation guide-
lines), made by Chief Cabinet Secretary Seiroku Kajiyama in a statement issued on August 17, 
1997, contributed to an even more strained relationship between China and Japan.60 
However, in Taiwan and most of the other East Asian countries, the new guidelines are 
seen rather in a positive light because of the stabilizing effect on the wider Asia-Pacific region 
or with some ambivalence because of the deeper mistrust in Japan’s security and defense poli-
cies (as in South Korea).61 In these cases, however, the U.S. and Japan have explained the 
reasons and implications and thus both sides have demonstrated their will to enhance trans-
parency, which has largely been successful (with the exception of China and North Korea). 
7. The Future of the Bilateral Security Alliance: Remaining Problems and 
the Gap between Expectations and Reality 
Japan is still facing problems on both fronts - domestically and externally - to implement the 
Guidelines of Defense Co-operation and to live up to its agreed security obligations. At the 
same time, it seems that both sides have talked past each other. While Washington has sought 
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confirmation of what Tokyo will or will not do to assist the United States in the event of a 
crisis, Japan has tried to find out through debate what it can or cannot do under its constitu-
tion. Most worrisome, however, it is the considerable gap between expectations and reality on 
both sides of the redefined U.S.-Japan security alliance that may produce fallout in the next 
crisis. In this context, the question is still open to what extent Japan is really prepared to per-
form certain military missions that fall into the grey zone due to the uncertainty surrounding 
the constitutionality of the roles. The present socio-economic and political crisis in East Asia 
and Japan has further strained the bilateral relationship and the pacifist roots are still strong in 
the Japanese society and political life. In countering Chinese accusations of a renewed Japa-
nese militarism and in striking contrast to Japan’s presumed ability to a formulate a growing 
defense posture, Nicholas D. Kristof  stated at the end of 1998: 
“In 1998, this fear of Japan, though deeply felt [in China and elsewhere in East Asia], is wholly mis-
placed. The most pacifist of countries, Japan is kept to shaken and frail by its wartime legacy that it will 
be incapable of aggression for decades to come. Not only do its neighbors not trust Japan; Japan does not 
trust itself. The country is still incapable of mounting a meaningful security policy. Surveys show that only 
46 percent of the public favor using force to defend Japan against invasion by another country. It may be 
unfair to blame all Japan for the weakness of diplomats like Yasushi Akashi, the former U.N. envoy to 
Yugoslavia. But his inability to countenance force as an instrument of policy is typical of many Japanese 
officials. And just as Akashi’s distaste for violence led to disaster in the Balkan’s, where it resulted in the 
murder of thousands of civilians, so Asia and America will suffer from Japan’s inability to contribute to 
regional security.”62 
7.1 External Considerations 
In the past, the policy of maintaining good relations with China and the U.S. was the only op-
tion for Japan. In the future, too, Japan cannot pursue a real independent strategy backed by 
national military power. At the same time, it is no longer possible to be a “civilian power” 
alone (Hanns Maull63) as was the case in the past, as this will neither be tolerated by the 
United States nor other countries inside and outside the region. In recent years, however, Chi-
nese suspicion of the U.S.-Japanese alliance has gradually intensified.64 In the Chinese view, 
the U.S.-Japanese security alliance should neither be too tense nor grow too strong and ex-
pand. This logic follows China’s traditional balance of power policies. At the same time, they 
continue to see, even after the newly defined bilateral security alliance, many potential risks. 
However, as private conversations with Chinese experts and diplomats often reveal, they rec-
ognize the fact that the only military alternative to a security alliance for Japan would be na-
tionalism and hence a remilitarization of Japan’s defense policies, which is certainly not in the 
Chinese security interest. Even more controversial for Beijing is Japan’s intention to deploy, 
together with the United States, a
 Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system, after North Korea 
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tested a three-staged Taepo-dong 1 missile at the end of August 1998. The test, which caused 
surprise even in U.S. intelligence circles, indicated that North Korea has now acquired the 
advanced technology to become in the next few years the fourth country - after the U.S., Rus-
sia and China - with an operational land-based, intercontinental missile capability. Confronted 
with this Korean missile and potential nuclear capability, the test changed significantly Ja-
pan’s short-term security perceptions and defense policies.65 Thus, in November 1998, for 
instance, after considering such a capability for nearly a decade, Japan’s government approved 
the plan to launch four reconnaissance satellites by the spring of 2003. 66 
These defense policy decisions of Japan have raised numerous objections from the Chi-
nese side since a TMD system is seen by the Chinese as overtly hostile threat which might 
lead to an open arms race between China and Japan. Furthermore, the U.S. and Japan are ex-
aggerating the military threat of missile attacks from North Korea (not to speak about China’s 
nuclear missile threat) and using it as a pretext to strengthen its military alliance and enhance 
a military presence in Asia which Beijing views as obsolete. Moreover, an effective TMD-
option of the U.S. and its main allies in East Asia against China’s nuclear missiles would not 
only question its nuclear deterrence against potential aggressors but also dramatically increase 
U.S. capabilities to launch a disarmaning strike against China. Consequently, China is - like 
Russia - essentially interested in the endorsement of the principles behind the ABM-treaty.67 
Furthermore, if Japan were to prefer a naval TMD-option, based, inter alia, on its Aegis-class 
destroyers, then even Taiwan might benefit from such a naval-based TMD umbrella. And in-
deed, the only thing that alarms Beijing more than TMD being deployed in Japan is TMD be-
ing deployed in Taiwan - possibly together with the U.S. and Japan. However, most of these 
Chinese arguments are not very convincing or persuasive if one analyses those counter-
argumentations more in detail.68 
For the first time since the end of World War II, Japanese diplomacy has increasingly 
faced the real challenge of balancing relations with Washington and Beijing and applying its 
own independent judgement. This already presented a basic dilemma for Japanese foreign 
policy when Hashimoto traveled to Beijing in September 1997 in order to improve and con-
solidate relations with China. Apart from the historical repercussions of Japan’s inability to 
admit to its historical guilt, the Taiwan question was of fundamental importance during 
Hashimoto’s visit in China. For the Chinese government, the question of whether or not Tai-
wan has been drafted into
 “situations they may emerge in the areas of surrounding Japan and 
which will have an important influence on the peace and security of Japan” (according to the 
Guidelines of Defense Co-operation between Washington and Tokyo), dominated the discus-
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sions and comments in the Chinese media. According to these Guidelines, the official position 
of the U.S. and Japanese government was always unequivocal – “areas surrounding Japan” is 
a “situational, not a geographical concept” as was already stipulated in the Guidelines. Un-
derstandably, this official interpretation has never satisfied the Chinese government. And in-
deed, this kind of deterrence follows Washington’s concept of “strategic ambiguity” towards 
China and other security challenges in the region.69  
It reflects, once again, the importance of stability in the triangular relationship. Although 
China is Japan’s second-largest trading partner after the United States, while Japan ranks first 
in China’s foreign trade and an increasing number of visitors travel between the two countries 
(which increased from 10,000 in 1972 to 1.1 million in 1995) as well as of Chinese students 
(account for 45 per cent of all foreign students)70, the growing economic interdependence has 
so far not changed the deep mistrust both countries have towards each other and their con-
flictual strategic interests.71 Both sides still hinder a fundamental rapprochement. Further-
more, additional problems and conflicts may arise in the near future.72 Thus, the Taiwan issue 
might become even more problematic in the China-Japan relationship since Taiwan’s continu-
ing democratization of its political system has gained increasing praise within the Japanese 
population and media. In a striking contrast, Beijing’s popularity, according to public opinion 
polls, reached historically its lowest level in Japan after World War II. Looking into the fu-
ture, the younger Japanese generation is less fearful than their elders of offending China and 
cares less about historical grievances, partly also as a result of its failing education in Japan’s 
history of colonizing and brutalizing East Asia by the Imperial Japanese military before and 
during World War II. Hence, a domestic policy shift in Japan’s future stance towards China 
cannot be excluded. In China, too, the improvement of the bilateral relationship reflects 
merely the surface. A Chinese opinion poll in December 1996 indicated that Chinese under 
the age of 40 overwhelmingly said that Japan wanted to become a military superpower again, 
and that the first thing they thought of in connection with Japan was the rape of Nanjing.73 
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China and Japan indeed see the future of Asian security in profoundly different ways, as the 
disappointing visit of Jiang Zemin in Tokyo in November 1998 demonstrated. He couldn’t get 
what he most wanted: a strongly worded apology passed as a parliamentary resolution and a 
direct statement on the “three no’s” (no to an independence of Taiwan, no to two Chinas and 
no to Taiwan’s participation in any international organizations in which statehood is a pre-
condition), including barring Taiwan’s entry into international organizations such as the 
WTO. While Japan has no problem to conform to a one-China policy and with excluding 
Taiwan from the UN, it supports Taiwan membership - in contrast to Clinton’s statement on 
the “three no’s” made during his Beijing visit in July 199874 - in other organizations, particu-
larly economic ones. 75 
But also in other Asian countries, ambivalent feelings still exist. This ambivalence, how-
ever, has not so much to do with the strengthening of the bilateral security alliance between 
Washington and Tokyo itself which will contribute to stability on the Korean peninsula or in 
the South China Sea. But South Koreans, for instance, remain cautious about an increasing 
military role of Japan whilst ASEAN states remain sensitive to China’s reaction and con-
cerned about the nature of the bilateral relationship between China and Japan or China and the 
U.S.76 
Moreover, since the economic crisis, mistrust on both sides of the security alliance has 
complicated the bilateral relationship. Clinton’s engagement policy towards China and the 
proclamation of a “constructive strategic partnership” with China has “alarmed Taiwan, un-
settled longtime U.S. allies Japan and South Korea, and prodded India to unveil its nuclear 
program” as Ted Galen Carpenter and other critical U.S. experts have criticized.77 Indeed, 
Clinton’s decision to bypass Tokyo after he returned from Beijing in July 1998 (reportedly, on 
Beijing’s insistence) and the insensitivity of renewed U.S. “Japan bashing” vis-à-vis its fail-
ing economic reform policies whilst at the same time unreservedly praising China’s economic 
reform policies (although it is still largely a state-directed economy), its intention not to de-
value its currency and, by taking measures to stabilize the region economically as well as by 
describing China as something similar to an “island of stability”, were seen as foolishly short-
sighted, counterproductive and failing to understand the complexities and psychologies of 
Japan’s domestic policies and the wider geopolitical, as well as geostrategic, implications of 
these policies. While Tokyo thus feels used and abused by Washington, the U.S. is thus play-
ing into the hands of anti-American advocates at a time when China barely conceals its inten-
tion to weaken the U.S.-Japanese security alliance. As one observer noted, it was “the first 
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time since World War II that the U.S. and China had joined together in publicly criticizing 
Japan.”78 Hence the perception of a U.S.-Chinese condominium that delivers South and East 
Asia over to a Chinese geostrategic sphere of interest has undermined the influence of the 
U.S. and its engagement policies in these parts of the world. At the same time, Japan has be-
come suddenly more distrustful of U.S. policy, which seems cozying too close to China. In the 
light of “Japan’s Depression Diplomacy”, Yoichi Funabashi noted at the end of 1998: “This 
downgrading of U.S.-Japan ties is particularly painful because it violates the highest virtue in 
Japanese society, loyalty. Once an alliance is entered, it is not subject to negotiation, justifi-
cation, or competition from a third party. The perceived betrayal strengthens Japanese advo-
cates of a “burdenless alliance”.”79  
Meanwhile, the U.S. is beginning to recognize its shortsighted policy vis-à-vis Tokyo and 
is now trying to repair and restore the bilateral relationship (as, for instance, the last visit of 
Japan’s Prime Minister Obuchi in Washington demonstrated)80 but uncertainties remain as 
Michael Jonathan Green and Nagashima Akihisa have concluded: “The question is, will the 
Clinton and Obuchi governments continue to put energy into enhancing the alliance, or will 
they leave things on autopilot because the economic crisis appears too difficult and the mu-
tual sense of frustration has become overwhelming?”81 
 
7.2 Okinawa as a Special Problem 
The stationing of U.S. troops in Okinawa remains difficult to solve politically. Japanese preju-
dices and lack of understanding have contributed to a widespread “siege mentality” on 
account of the economic and social impacts of the military bases in Okinawa. After the return 
of Okinawa to Japan, it continued to bear the burden of the military bases in Japan. Okinawa, 
in terms of population, is still concentrated 300 times more heavily than the rest of Japan. In 
spite of a government investment of more than 5 trillion yen in Okinawa’s economic revival 
over the last 25 years after, it has remained the poorest prefecture in Japan in terms of average 
annual income and, in the 1990s, had the highest unemployment rate at about 6 per cent (twice 
the national average). In the view of Okinawans, Tokyo did not live up to the promise of Vice-
Admiral Minoru Ota (at the end of World War II) to in future give “special consideration” to 
the Okinawans.82 More than 250,000 people on the island, nearly one fifth of the present 
population of Okinawa, died in the battle of Okinawa at the end of World War II. The prefec-
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ture provides more than 75 per cent of the Japanese land used for U.S. bases, and more than 
half of the U.S. troops in Japan are based on the island. This has led to an increase in crime 
and traffic accidents. Though their local anger has been aroused against foreign military pres-
ence, it is even more directed towards the Japanese and Tokyo than to the U.S. soldiers on the 
island. Although the U.S. bases also provide significant economic benefits (Okinawa earns 
over 180 billion yen annually in revenue and more than 23,000 local residents have their jobs 
on U.S. bases), Okinawa’s governor, Masahide Ota, hopes to close all U.S. bases in the is-
lands by 2015.83  
In dealing with the reduction of the bases and facilities, a Special Action Committee on 
Okinawa (SACO) was established between both sides at the end of 1995. Furthermore, an 
Okinawa Problem Committee was created as a channel to consider the issues from the view-
point of the Okinawan residents. Although some progress has been made since the rape inci-
dent in September 1995, many issues are still unresolved. The proposed return of the Futenma 
Marine Corps Air Station (an airstrip in the middle of a congested Okinawan City) in 5-7 
years like other questions involve many practical problems. Theoretically, the U.S. Marines 
and other facilities can move from Okinawa to the main islands of Japan. But from a military 
strategic point of view they must be deployed on the Japanese territory for rapid emergency 
deployment in crisis and conflicts such as on the Korean peninsula. Only the U.S. Marine 
Corps, for instance, offers the operational capabilities and requirements for rapid amphibious 
deployment, self-sustaining missions and the introduction of follow-on forces by securing 
staging areas ashore.84 But other Japanese prefectures are still opposed to the transfers of U.S. 
facilities and soldiers to their areas. They live selfishly at the expense of the Okinawans who 
must continue to bear an unjustified military burden in the name of Japan as a whole. In con-
trast to many comments, the outcome of the gubernatorial elections in Okinawa in November 
199885, when the incumbent governor Matahide Ota lost to a pragmatic conservative, the 
former chairman of a local petroleum company,
 Keiichi Inamine, 65, has not completely 
changed the picture and circumstances for the future of the military bases in Okinawa. Al-
though the majority of voters seemed more concerned with the prefecture’s difficult economic 
situation (which meanwhile has the Japan’s highest unemployment rate with 9.2 per cent and 
which has been particularly affected by Japan’s economic malaise in recent years, and the pre-
sent financial and economic crisis in East Asia, and with Mr. Inamine being more pragmatic 
by suggesting more co-operative approaches such as the building of a new heliport in the less 
congested northern part of Okinawa), the basic problem of transferring some military bases to 
Japan’s mainland in order to reduce the military burden for the Okinawian people has as yet 
not been solved. Moreover, Tokyo’s bureaucracy seeks still to choose the easiest way forward 
by dismissing the objections and feelings of the Okinawan people as it has done throughout 
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the last 50 years. The need for reducing the military burden of Okinawa, however, will not 
disappear, as is also the case for the need to maintain U.S. troops in Okinawa and other Japa-
nese territories. In the end, the outcome of the gubernatorial elections has only “bought some 
breathing space. The fact remains that Okinawans generally are unhappy with the military 
bases.”86 Even Mr. Inamine has limited the U.S. military presence on the islands to 15 years. 
This reflects local sentiment, confirmed by opinion polls, which remains strongly against the 
bases.87 
 
7.3 The Domestic Front 
Similar like Japan’s quest for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, a greater security 
role for Japan in the region, as well as in the bilateral security alliance with the U.S., is not 
without its fair share of problems and controversies. In the new post Cold War era, the former 
“cheque book diplomacy” is no longer sufficient for Japan’s role in the newly defined bilateral 
security relationship with the U.S. As long as Japan remains unwilling to assume more mili-
tary obligations in peace time, crises and war-time, a permanent seat in the UN Security 
Council will remain unrealistic, unless Japan (like Germany) commits itself to engage fully in 
UN peacekeeping and peacemaking operations.88 As the U.S. withdrawal from Somalia and 
the reluctance to become militarily involved in Bosnia and Rwanda indicated, Washington is 
an increasingly casualty-sensitive country. Washington seems less and less willing to have 
Americans die in foreign countries, unless there is a clear and vital national interest at stake. 
Despite the positive steps that have been made in strengthening the bilateral alliance in recent 
years, the Japanese government needs to bolster its achievements with a more open dialogue 
to inform its own public. Broad public understanding of the necessity to assume new obliga-
tions within the alliance is an essential prerequisite for broad public support and regional ac-
ceptance in neighboring states. In this regard, more transparency is urgently necessary. The 
success of Japan’s acceptance of new international roles and of future regional security de-
pends on the justification of the new roles and obligations both in detail and in principle, since 
the former alliance presumptions are no longer valid. Hence the Japanese government must 
see itself as having a fundamental interest to initiate a serious national foreign and security 
debate. Thus far, however, the government seems to handle sensitive foreign and security is-
sues like it always has and to avoid such a nation-wide debate with its public and local au-
thorities. In the light of a continuing
 “internal democratization of foreign policy” in Japan, 
such attitudes of government and bureaucratic elites are outdated have become a major obsta-
cle to assuming new international roles. Moreover, the lack of such an open debate also un-
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dermines the political and military efficiency of a joint political crisis management and the 
bilateral defense co-operation when it is most needed. U.S. expert Paul S. Giarra warned at 
the beginning of 1997: 
“To redress the shortfalls, legislation, policies and cooperation between ministries must be arranged and 
settled in advance as part of the defense guidelines review process, not as a desperate last-minute effort in 
the face of a crisis. Needs must be explained to the municipal and prefectural governments involved and 
their explicit cooperation secured in advance. To delay would be militarily ineffective and politically dis-
astrous. Otherwise Japan will be passed by militarily and, ultimately, cast adrift politically.”89 
The need for such a domestic debate has recently been highlighted by the incursion of two 
suspected North Korean military vessels and Japanese “aggressive response” by firing ammu-
nition and sending destroyers in pursuit. However, Japan’s coast guard vessels were too slow 
and vessels of the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Forces (JMSDF) tried unsuccessfully to 
pursue the North Korean ships.90 As a result, the North Korean intruders were able to flee 
toward the North Korean coast. But the result was the “first purely military operation ever 
assigned to the Self Defense Forces.”91 The JMSDF passive operation and the unsuccessful 
pursuit of the two fleeing ships can be explained by the fact that they are bound by extremely 
restrictive rules concerning the use of weapons in such situations. Thus the pursuit operation 
had to be legitimized
 “on Paragraph 11, Article 6 of the Defense Agency Establishment Law, 
which stipulates that the SDF may carry out “research” necessary to execute its duties” and 
by applying “such seemingly irrelevant legislation as the Fisheries Law in dealing with the 
fleeing ships.” 92 This inadequacy in the SDF’s rules has triggered a discussion about how the 
country should cope with an apparent challenge to its territory, how active Japan should be-
come in its own defense and to what extent Japan is really prepared to cope with new security 
challenges.93 It thus revealed the shortcomings, not only of the current legislation, but even of 
the Guidelines themselves because they address defense co-operation only under normal cir-
cumstances, in the event of an armed attack against Japan, and in situations in areas surround-
ing Japan as already indicated above. The incident thus revealed a significant lack of Japan’s 
defense ability in routine peacetime defense operations and in cases which so far have been 
not identified. Thus, as in the case of Japan’s Maritime Safety Agency coast guard ships, 
JMSDF naval vessels are only permitted to fire warning shots that “will not cause human in-
jury” and even then only where a potential aggressor fired first.94 Similarly, according to 
Ralph Cossa, some Japanese defense experts have even argued that Japanese ships armed with 
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defensive missiles operating outside Japan’s territorial waters would not be permitted to fire at 
incoming missiles until the first missile struck Japan. Hence, though the implementation of 
the Defense Guidelines allows for a greater, smoother and more effective military co-
operation between Japan and the U.S., it “still falls short of permitting Japanese Self Defense 
Forces from effectively responding to such situations”95 or other newly arising security chal-
lenges. In many ways, the incident was more significant “what didn’t happen” as the Far 
Eastern Economic Review has argued:  
“The rounds fired by the coastguard and navy were merely warning shots, and didn’t stop the intruders 
from speeding back to a North Korean port. Nor did Tokyo make any determined effort to capture the 
ships - a step that could have provoked a battle, with casualties on both sides. In fact, the Japanese gave 
up the chase when the ships were in international waters.”96 
Furthermore, and contrary to the public perception, the agreed Guidelines of Bilateral Defense 
Co-operation will not automatically be invoked nor are they currently ready to be imple-
mented. On the contrary, it is the political decision of the leadership in Tokyo and Washington 
that will finally activate the line of joint operation at a time of a crisis. Even beforehand, the 
Japanese government will have to enact new laws or to revise existing legislative acts - such 
as the Law of the Self Defense Forces - to formally implement the above activities. Moreover, 
the Guidelines review was from the very beginning conducted with the basic premise that the 
rights and obligations under the current U.S.-Japanese Security arrangements will remain un-
changed and that Japanese actions will also remain restricted within the limitations of its con-
stitution and other basic stated principles. This raises many questions concerning the ability of 
future Japanese governments to live up to the agreed obligations. In this respect, some doubts 
remain due to specific traits of the Japanese political culture, an increasingly outdated political 
system and its impact on political crisis management, as well as in regard to its bilateral rela-
tionship to China. Characteristically, the government’s most successful argumentation in par-
liamentary debates about the implementation of the Defense Guidelines has been gaiatsu (for-
eign pressure) - an implicit threat that Washington will be upset if the bills aren’t imple-
mented.97 
If China becomes an increasing threat or even enemy of Japan or the bilateral alliance with 
Washington, Japan would have no choice but to side with the U.S. However, there is a wide-
spread believe in Japan that in case of a U.S.-China conflict, Japan should stay neutral and not 
become involved in such a conflict. Yabuki Susumu, for instance, demanded in November 
1995:  
“If U.S.-China relations move in the direction of confrontation, Japan, of course, can do nothing about it. 
No matter how strong Washington’s demands, Tokyo cannot cooperate in imposing even economic sanc-
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tions, much less military ones. The most crucial thing is for Japan to be clearly aware that its only choice 
is to avoid movement in that direction.”98 
This, however, runs contrary to the agreed security alliance with the U.S. and the expectations 
and perceptions of U.S. politicians, especially in the U.S. Congress. If Japan refuses to side 
unequivocally with the U.S. in a foreign policy crisis, the security alliance might be dead the 
next day. Even a slow Japanese response - as was the case during the Taiwan crisis, when the 
government needed more than three weeks to respond to a request from Washington for the 
delivery of spare parts, oil and ammunition - might upset the alliance, given the expected atti-
tude of the U.S. Congress in such a scenario. However, given the political culture in Japan and 
her understanding of crisis management and political leadership (which means building at first 
consensus in the government party, the bureaucracy, together with a possible coalition party, 
and then in the Diet), it seems somehow questionable whether Japan will be able to live up to 
its treaty obligations. The crisis management of the former Japanese governments in the Kobe 
earthquake at the beginning of 1995, during the AUM Shinrykio gas attack shortly afterwards 
and the following events of chaos in the government, as well as in the police in coping with 
the new terrorist threat and during the Taiwan crisis from summer 1995 to the spring of 1996 
and the more recent incident by North Korean ships intruding Japanese waters, as well as the 
initial reaction of the bureaucracy when North Korea tested a three-stage Taepo-dong missile 
over Japan99, were all characterized by delay, indecision and a fundamental lack of political 
leadership. That kind of crisis management does not bode well for any other major crisis the 
bilateral security alliance may face in the future. Even a member of Japan’s House of Repre-
sentatives and former parliamentary vice-minister of foreign affairs, Shozo Azuma, was forced 
to admit: “Japan is not prepared to deal with a crisis of any nature, domestic or foreign; the 
nation is an accident waiting to happen.”100 
Presently, Japan’s inability to respond swiftly and confidently to the current financial and 
economic crises in a rapidly changing world seems to demonstrate once again that its political 
system is haunted by political infighting, a leaden bureaucracy and a reliance on foreign pres-
sure (“gaiatsu”) to force any major political decisions.101 As long as Japan is not deeply re-
forming her entire economic and political system, it seems neither able to return to a higher 
economic growth nor to show any political leadership in Asia.102 In this light, it is not so 
much the incompetence of Hashimoto or any other prominent political figure or government 
in Japan, but the political system in Japan as such which seems largely outdated and unable to 
undertake the rapid and flexible political decision-making urgently needed for the 21st cen-
tury. As an insider admitted: “In our collective group decision-making no one has the power 
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to say right or wrong, black or white.”103 In the face of its current economic turmoil, it is not 
so much Japan’s unwillingness than the inability of her political system that explains Japan’s 
economic and political paralysis.104 As long as Japan has no modern political system which is 
open to public and particularly the middle class influence rather than to bureaucrats and nar-
row interest groups, the crisis in Japan and in Asia may well last much longer than most Japa-
nese and foreign observers assume. But there is some light at the end of the tunnel: the last 
Japanese elections in July 1998 clearly demonstrated that Japanese voters apparently under-
stand the country’s problems better than the current leadership. These elections have also 
shown that the ruling LDP is increasingly out of touch with the majority of Japanese society 
(supported only by older voters as public opinion surveys have indicated).105 In this regard, I 
follow the argumentation of the U.S. expert Robert M. Orr, Jr.: “ ... the Japan of the next cen-
tury needs to depend less upon outsiders for positive change in this society, but more on the 
people and less on the bureaucrats.”106 At the same time, Japan’s political system and her 
society is confronted with the wide-ranging implications of “internationalization” and “glob-
alization”. To remain a major industrial nation in the future, based primarily on intellectual 
resources, Japan will be forced to improve its labor productivity by promoting free competi-
tion and to foster creativity by encouraging free thinking.107 For many Japanese, this presents 
a similar revolutionary challenge to those in the Meiji era. However, many once-time taboos 
in Japan’s domestic discussion of its foreign, security and even defense policies, such as 
building limited first-strike capabilities (i.e. airborne refueling equipment, assault ships with 
helicopters and Harrier-type aircraft to land in mid-sea), Japanese participation in peacekeep-
ing operations, loosening restrictions on Japan’s military support for the U.S. in the region, 
purchase of four reconnaissance satellites and funding research and development to build a 
TMD system are now rapidly fading.108 
This inability of Japanese crisis management also has fundamental implications for the fu-
ture of the bilateral security alliance. Hashimoto”s pledge of a greater defense role in the re-
gion in April 1996, when the bilateral security relationship was redefined, has pushed the 
boundaries of current interpretations of the restrictions imposed on Japan’s military by Article 
                                                 
103  Kevin Sullivan/Mary Jordan, IHT (10 April 1998: 17). Another typical feature of the Japan’s culture is 
that they tend not to speak out face-to-face problems during day-time. So to listen what they really think, it 
is important to meet them later and have really frank discussions over dinner. 
104  Characteristically, the performance of a recent Japanese-IMF meeting in mid-April 1998 has been de-
scribed by Western observers as follows: “The Japanese presentation was incomprehensible, for all of us. 
... The [finance] minister [of Japan, Hikaru Matsunaga] gave a two-hour speech that we could not under-
stand. When we started to ask him questions, he started to repeat the speech. I have no idea how Japan 
sees the problem, or what can be done” and ”It is not that the Japanese described an approach with which 
we disagreed. They described nothing at all. It was as if they were on another planet, dealing with a to-
tally different situations that we know nothing about” - see Jim Hoagland, IHT (23 April 1998: 9). 
105  See Johnstone (1998). 
106  Robert J. Orr, Jr., TKH (26 December 1997: 6). 
107  See Taichi Sakaiya, TKH (21 January 1998: 6). 
108  See also Stephanie Strom, IHT (9 April 1999: 2). 
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9 in the so-called “Peace Constitution”, although the government declared in the Diet that no 
new interpretation or revision would be necessary. The key to continued American presence 
and influence in the region will depend on the continued integrity of the U.S.-Japanese alli-
ance. And the latter will depend heavily on the continuity and consistency of Japan’s defined 
national interests and the assessment of its own mid- and long-term policy considerations. The 
so-called “Partnership in Leadership” declaration might satisfy the majority of Japanese poli-
ticians and the public concerning Japan’s ambitions to assume a greater political role in the 
“unequal alliance”. But the question remains whether Japan is really prepared to assume such 
a role in the new security environment. Thus far, Japan has only a record of being leader “as 
long as there is no real combat activity requiring the sheriff himself to handle things prop-
erly” as the German Japan expert Markus Tidten stated at the end of 1997.109 And indeed, it is 
also necessary to raise the even more painful question for Japan of “who will be willing to 
accept Japan’s leadership in the region”?110 In many respects, the redefinition of the security 
alliance and the Guidelines for Defense Co-operation was not so much an American request 
list than sincere considerations on both sides of what Japan can be asked to fulfil as her part of 
the alliance’s obligations without endangering the future of the partnership.111  
While most Japanese experts still interpret the constitutional provisions of the “use of 
force” in a way that prohibits the participation of SDF in combat actions that also include the 
transportation of materials (particularly ammunition) and its own weapon systems into combat 
zones, meanwhile it might be able to transport at least U.S. weapons and ammunitions in rear-
areas in non-combat zones.112 Furthermore, the new Liberal Party head and “strong man”, 
Ozawa Ichiro113, recently went even further and interpreted the controversial sentence “situa-
tions in areas surrounding Japan“ not as a “situational concept” but indeed as a geographical 
one because those “situations” might inevitably have significant impact on Japan’s peace and 
security, the Japanese government has been forced to re-define this in such a way that the dis-
puted interpretations of the controversial sentence of the scope of “Far East” now “1) corre-
spond to cases which will have significant impact on Japan’s peace and security, 2) include 
geographical elements, but 3) do not imply any specific areas.”114 Moreover, it remains diffi-
cult to understand, even for U.S. experts familiar which Japan’s domestic debates, that the 
new Defense Guidelines have expanded Japan’s security and defense roles in Asia. The 1960 
Mutual Defense Treaty already refers in regard to Japan’s co-operation to promote regional 
stability to the “Far East”. Furthermore, former Japanese governments have since the 1980s 
                                                 
109  Markus Tidten, TKH (6 December 1997: 6). 
110  Ibid. 
111  Ibid. 
112  See Soeya (1999). 
113  Ichiro Ozawa became well-known for his 1993 book “Blueprint for a New Japan”’ in which he criticized 
Japan’s “politics as usual” approach as a major obstacle for devising a realistic national security strategy 
based on a strong security alliance with the U.S. 
114  See Soeya (1999) 
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accepted a sea lane defense up to 1,000 nautical miles from Japan.115 It is not difficult to fore-
see and to assume that this re-definition will not be the last, given Japan’s more intensive de-
bate in recent years and newly emerging situations which have as yet not been addressed by 
the Defense Guidelines. On the other hand, a clarification of the area might unnecessarily pro-
voke China, “while excluding Taiwan would be tantamount to giving China a green light to 
use force against Taiwan without having to be concerned about Japanese security con-
cerns.”116 Nonetheless, a gap remains between U.S. expectations (particularly in the U.S. 
Congress) and the consensus in Japan’s domestic audience. In many ways, Japan still seems 
insufficiently prepared for a real
 “Partnership in Leadership”. Australian expert Andrew 
Mack warned in June 1997: 
“If a crisis erupted tomorrow, Japan’s reaction could be determined less by the constitution or the new 
guidelines than by bitter political fights over their proper interpretation. Such squabbles could well last 
longer than the war. ... 
Yet something needs to be done. The fact that, after decades together as allies, the United States and Japan 
still have no clearly defined and agreed rules of military cooperation in a crisis is not just bizarre. It could 
be seriously destabilizing in a real-life conflict.”117 
If this conclusion is correct, then the U.S. has to bear in mind that Japan might also in future 
not be fully prepared and the U.S. should not demand too much from Japan if a new crisis 
arises.118 Accordingly, U.S. experts like Robert M. Orr, Jr. have warned:  
“Do we really believe that the Japanese side would follow every letter of the new defense guidelines in an 
emergency? The fact that the military forces of both countries have a record of exceedingly good coopera-
tion does not negate the reality that lack of a ‘buy-in’ by the localities with the Japanese central govern-
ment in a crisis situation could throw a monkey wrench into the whole situation. If so, it would reflect the 
fate of many U.S.-Japan trade agreements in which differing interpretations amount to the norm as op-
posed to the exception.”119 
At the same time, public opinion polls often reveal contradicting or ambiguous trends. Ac-
cording to an opinion poll in August 1996, for instance, 76 per cent of Japanese favor revising 
the American-written “Peace Constitution” in favor of a new Japanese written constitution. 
But it remains unclear whether this can be seen as another indication of becoming
 “a normal 
nation” or as a new spirit of nationalism which is feared by much of Asia, as well as by parts 
of Japanese society.120  
                                                 
115  See Cossa (1999). 
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8. Conclusions and Perspectives 
At first glance, the strategic security outlook in North and East Asia seems never to have been 
so positive on account of the almost simultaneous improvement in bilateral relations between 
each of the four major powers in the region - Japan, China, Russia and the United States - 
during the last three years. The two Jiang-Clinton summits in late October 1997 and May 
1998 marked the beginning of a new strategic partnership between the U.S. and China after 
the bloody Tiananmen events in 1989 and the Taiwan crisis in 1995-96. These two summits 
have enhanced trust, reduced differences and developed co-operation that promises to avoid 
open confrontation, as in the Taiwan crisis in 1995-96. It forced the two leading great powers 
in the Asia-Pacific region to develop a workable strategic framework for the management of 
their relationship into the 21st century. On the other hand, however, these summits have also 
caused some ambivalent feelings in Japan concerning the bilateral security alliance with the 
U.S. While Japan also welcomes better U.S.-Chinese relations, they do not welcome them at 
the expense of good Japan-U.S relations.121 These sensitivities on the Japanese side must also 
take into account the fact that Japan’s traditional postwar role as a “bridge” between the two 
cultures of Asia and the West is no longer necessary given the numerous new direct institu-
tional links between these two regions (APEC, ASEM, ARF, CSCAP etc.). In this newly evolv-
ing geopolitical order, Japan increasingly fears being passed over. It has thus become fashion-
able to say that the U.S. attitude towards Japan has changed from “Japan bashing” to “Japan 
passing”.122 In this regard, Washington needs to rebuild trust and confidence in its bilateral 
relationship with Tokyo, which must last longer than any sudden economic or other clashes of 
competing interests that realistically can not totally be avoided between the two countries. 
The new tendency to institutionalize multilateral security dialogues rather than conflict 
resolution mechanisms suggests that the analytical tool of multilateralism versus bilateralism 
is too simplistic and consequently gives rise to a false debate for the multifaceted regional 
security environment in Asia-Pacific. As the new multilateralism, as well as the violent crisis 
and the forced unilateral response by the United States particularly in 1995-96, have demon-
strated, both elements are necessary in establishing a viable, double-layered security architec-
ture in the Asia Pacific region that is able and flexible enough to cope with the new challenges 
and uncertainties of the transformation processes into the next century. The security architec-
ture in the Asia-Pacific region thus comprises strong bilateral relationships interwoven with 
multilateral security arrangements such as the ARF. Both components are not mutually exclu-
sive but mutually reinforcing and supportive.123 To this extent, the U.S.-Japan alliance and 
the other four solid bilateral defense relations of the U.S. with the Philippines, Thailand, Aus-
tralia and South Korea remain the bedrock of security and stability in the region as the official 
                                                 
121  See Tom Plate, IHT (2-3 May 1998: 6). 
122  See Haruyuki Aikawa, Mainichi Daily News (22 August 1996).  
123  See also Cossa (1997: 37) and Umbach (1998a: 277f.). 
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U.S.
 East Asia Strategy Report 1998 has confirmed: “The United States will remain globally 
engaged to shape the international environment; respond to the full spectrum of crises; and 
prepare now for an uncertain future.”124 These bilateral defense alliances provide a reliable 
insurance mechanism if preventive diplomacy should fail, as is the case in Europe with NATO 
and its interlocking institutions of OSCE and the EU/WEU. 
Japan’s “two track-policy” since 1992, but also similar policies of many ASEAN states 
confirm these conclusions. The U.S. presence is still perceived to be indispensable by most 
East Asian states, as a counterbalance to any attempts by regional powers such as China, Ja-
pan or India to expand their influence at the expense of smaller countries and to adopt a desta-
bilizing assertive role in the region. In this light, the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan military 
alliance has demonstrated U.S. determination to retain an active role in the Pacific. Against 
this background, the redefined bilateral security treaty serves three major purposes for main-
taining security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region: 
• (1) it provides a “nuclear umbrella” that has protected Japan and allowed it to avoid po-
litically complicated issues; 
• (2) it guarantees a continuous U.S. military presence in the region, which allows Japan 
and other Asian countries to cope with transition in an atmosphere of stability; 
• (3) it helps the U.S. to protect its interests in the region, while reducing its military-
related costs through Japan’s host nation support.125 
With the consolidation of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, Japan’s increasing independent 
role as a major security actor is now - as the new and old partner of the U.S. - less worrisome 
for the rest of East Asia (though with the notable exceptions of China and North Korea). At 
the same time, however, new Japanese calls (in the light of the current economic and financial 
crisis) for a reduction of U.S. military bases and the Japanese host nation support to “carry the 
largest burden among the U.S. allies” are continuing, as was demonstrated by the former 
Japanese Prime Minister, Morihiro Hosokawa, in the summer of 1998.126 Given mutual ex-
pectations on both sides of the bilateral relationship in the current financial and economic cri-
sis, both parties have a  responsibility to avoid a crisis of mutual confidence in order not to 
undermine the overall regional security architecture.127 In this regard, from a liberal theory of 
international relations, it is necessary to base the future bilateral security alliance between Ja-
pan and the U.S. more on an equal partnership and common values, shared effort as well as 
shared decision-making that ultimately serve the goals of democracy, human rights, economic 
                                                 
124  The Secretary of Defense (1998: 8). In the context see also Wagner (1999). 
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development and regional inclusiveness.128 As the recent election of Shinaro Ishihara, a well-
known nationalist (who dismissed the 1937 Rape of Nanking as “fabrication” and that Japa-
nese aggression rescued Asia from “colonization by white people”) and author of the 1980 
book
 
“The Japan That Can Say No” (urging a more assertive policy toward the U.S. and 
China), to the new governor of Tokyo demonstrated, however, the attacks of pacifists and na-
tionalists on the U.S.-Japanese security alliance and other sensitive and critical key questions 
of a balanced Japanese foreign and security policy are far from over. Thus
 Ishihara publicly 
demanded that the U.S. to give up the Yokota Air base in Tokyo.129 
Despite the legislative approval of the Defense Guidelines by a Lower House special com-
mittee at the end of April 1999, the closed door meetings between the LDP, Liberal Party, 
New Komeito and the Democratic Party of Japan (spending most of their time to reach com-
promises over terms and phrases of the bill) and the debate focusing rather on military-
technical aspects (since the government was so anxious to obtain the Lower House’s approval) 
has hindered the need to initiate a more open debate among the Japanese public about the 
overall vision of Japan’s security policy and the significance of the Guidelines for the bilateral 
security alliance with Washington. Nonetheless, the legislation is a great step forward in ena-
bling Japan to play a significantly larger role in the security of its own territory and allows 
Japan for the first time to co-operate with U.S. forces also in “areas surrounding” Japan. Fur-
thermore, although the clause concerning ship inspections was removed, SDF logistic support 
operations in non-combat zones as well as search-and-rescue operations continue to need a 
Diet approval. But in the event of high-level emergencies, the approval can also come after an 
SDF dispatch. During such logistic support and search-and-rescue operations in non-combat 
zones, the use of weapons is allowed but at the same time restricted to self-defense.130 Fur-
thermore, as the result of Ichiro Ozawa’s ability to force political changes, Japanese units will 
in future share the same risks of peacekeeping as all other countries. Japanese commanders  
will thus now even be able to direct the defense of their units in the event that they are at-
tacked.131 
Moreover, Japan’s participation in the TMD project together with the U.S. will strengthen 
Japan’s defenses and deterrence posture and deflect pressure at home for it to have a nuclear 
deterrent capability. This, however, might not be totally excluded in the future. Even in the 
case where the U.S. and its major allies in Northeast Asia were to stop their plans for TMD 
development and deployment, Beijing’s strategic nuclear force modernization would nonethe-
less continue for other military-strategic reasons and probable internal bureaucratic factors, as 
Chinese experts privately admit.132  
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But both the U.S. and Japan need to demonstrate that the aim of their alliance is the pres-
ervation of security rather than the containment of China. At the same time, Japan should play 
a constructive and visible role in the multilateral security institutions for easing tensions on 
the Korean peninsula or in other potential flashpoints. Therefore, the U.S.-Japanese security 
alliance must be harmonized with the U.S.-South Korean alliance. In the short- and long-term, 
the U.S. can neither address the proliferation challenges on the Korean peninsula or other se-
curity challenges in the region nor can it credibly engage China or maintain open and SLOCs 
without Japanese assistance. Such a harmonization between these two security alliances has 
also important foreign, security and defense implications for Japan and South Korea.133 It 
would also allow a greater bi- and trilateral security and defense co-operation towards the 
North Korean security challenges on the peninsula and significantly open a way for a much 
closer relationship between Japan and South Korea.  
Given its traditional strategic security culture of “reluctant realism” as a guiding determin-
ing factor and philosophy of Japan’s international relations after World War Two, Japan will 
to some extent still remain a “reluctant power” in the foreseeable future although the strategic 
security culture of realism is gradually and incrementally increasing as recent shifts in the evo-
lution of Japan’s security and defense policies, particularly after the Indian and Pakistani nu-
clear tests in May 1998, as well as North Korea’s three-stage Taepo-Dong missile launch at 
the end of August 1998 demonstrate. Institutional enhancements such as the establishment of 
the
 Japan Defense Intelligence Head-quarters in 1997 and a strategic planning unit in 1998, 
as well as an increasing active defense diplomacy (including military exchanges, training, 
multilateral forums) are also indicators of a more active national and independent defense 
policy although these changes and enhancements also contribute to the strengthening of the 
U.S.-Japanese security alliance. To this extent, the Japanese role within the alliance is clearly 
growing, and Japan is at the same time becoming a more equal partner for the U.S., which will 
bolster the U.S.-Japanese security alliance into the 21st century. 
                                                 
133  See also Hisahiko Okazaki, The Daily Yomiuri (29 March 1999). 
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The Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation 
(September 1997) 
I. Aim:  
to create a solid basis for Japan/U.S. cooperation in case of an armed attack against 
Japan and in situations in areas surrounding Japan 
 
III: Cooperation Under Normal Circumstances: 
-  maintaining existing U.S./Japan security arrangements; 
-  as a basis for self defense Japan’s “National Defense Program Outline”; 
- U.S. will maintain its nuclear deterrent capability, forward deployed forces in Asia-Pacific 
region and other forces; 
-  close U.S./Japan cooperation for the defense of Japan and the creation of a more stable 
international security environment (i.e. mutual support activities or Reciprocal Provision of 
Logistic Support): 
-  both governments will increase information and intelligence sharing at as many levels as 
possible (i.e. SCC and Security Sub Committee meetings); 
-  recognizing the importance of security dialogues defense exchanges in the region and in-
ternational arms control and disarmament; 
-  close cooperation in the case of participation in UN-peacekeeping operations (i.e. transpor-
tation, medical services or information sharing); 
-  both governments will conduct bilateral work, including defense planning in case of an 
armed attack against Japan; 
-  bilateral exercises and training, establishing a bilateral coordination mechanism. 
IV: Actions in Response to An Armed Attack Against Japan 
-  in case of an armed attack appropriate bilateral measures to repel it at the earliest possible  
stage; 
-  preparations necessary for ensuring coordinated responses; 
-  U.S./Japan will prepare to respond to activities which could develop into an armed attack 
against Japan. 
When an armed attack against Japan takes place: 
-  bilateral cooperation may vary according scale, type, phases and other factors of an armed 
attack; 
-  the self defense forces will primarily conduct self defense operations on Japanese territory 
and surrounding waters, while U.S. forces would support Self-Defense Forces operations; 
-  both will bilaterally conduct operations for the defense of surrounding waters and for the 
protection of sea lines of communication; 
-  primary responsibility of the Self Defense Force is to check and repel guerilla-attacks or 
other unconventional attacks at the earliest possible stage; 
-  U.S./Japan coordination to respond to ballistic missile attack; 
-  bilateral coordination center for effective bilateral operations . 
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V. Cooperation in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan that will have an important 
influence on Japan’s peace and security (Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan) 
-  such situations will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security; 
-  the concept “situations in areas surrounding Japan” is not geographic but situational; 
-  when such a situation is anticipated, both governments will intensify information and intel-
ligence sharing; 
-  in response to such situations both governments will take appropriate measures such as  
 • relief activities and measures to deal with refugees; 
 • search and rescue; 
 • noncombatant evacuation operations (from a third country); 
         • activities for ensuring the effectiveness of economic sanctions for the maintenance of          
            international peace and stability; rear area support by Japan to U.S. forces (primarily in     
            Japanese territory). 
 
VI. Bilateral Programs for Effective Defense Cooperation Under the Guidelines 
-  information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations; 
-  establishing two mechanisms: 
 • comprehensive mechanism for bilateral planning, establishment of common standards; 
 • bilateral coordination mechanism that will include relevant agencies of the two    
            countries for coordinating respective activities during contingencies. 
-  U.S. forces and Self Defense Forces will conduct bilateral defense planning; 
-  mutual cooperation planning must be consistent; 
-  establishing common standards for preparations for the defense of Japan; 
-  common procedures will also include criteria for properly controlling respective unit opera-
tions, importance of communications and electronics interoperability. 
Source: Frank Umbach, following ‘The Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Co-operation’, in:  
              Strategic Digest, November 1997, pp. 1723-1730.  
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